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Abstract
Through an investigation of selected jurisdictions, this paper aims to contribute to the 
extant literature in investigating the relationship between central bank independence and 
price stability, as well as how such a relationship varies between different jurisdictions – 
even  though  it  is  widely  argued  that  political  and  legislative  interference  is  often 
contributory  to  price  instability.  This  paper  employs  times  series  data  to  study  the 
dynamics  of  central  bank  independence  in  the  Nigerian  economy.  This  study  also 
employs  bivariate  cointegration  methodology  to  examine  the  long-term  relationship 
between  inflation  index  and  the  different  measures  of  financial  development  in  the 
Nigerian economy.
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The Dynamics Of Central Bank Independence In A Developing Economy
Introduction
In most economies, the financial system architecture plays a significant role in economic 
development.  At the pinnacle of the financial structure is a central bank which performs 
basic functions such as keeping the payments system and the financial structure safe and 
sound;  and  providing  financial  services  to  the  governments  and  other  financial 
intermediaries.   More  significant  is  the  bank’s  role  in  monetary  policy  which  has 
implications for the long-run growth and development of the economy.   Studies have 
shown that a high level of central bank independence is required to assure price stability 
in an economy (Cukierman, 1992 and Cukierman et al., 1992).  Further, it is believed that 
the government generally suffers from inflation bias which is injurious to the economy 
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983).  In order to arrest this situation, 
an independent and conservative central bank is needed to neutralize the inflation bias in 
the economy (Rogoff, 1985).  Earlier empirical investigations of this subject matter are 
based on cross-sectional analysis  and their results point in the direction of a negative 
relationship  between  central  bank  independence  and  inflation  especially  in  industrial 
countries. So far, only a couple of studies are based on time series analysis. This paper 
employs  times series data to study the dynamics of central  bank independence in the 
Nigerian economy.
Central Bank Independence: Theory and Evidence
The issue of central bank independence is as old as one can image. Ricardo ……. Keynes
According to Fischer (1995), central bank independence can be dichotomized into two, 
goal independence and instrument independence.  A central bank has goal independence 
when it is given power to set its policy goals.  On the other hand, a central bank has 
instrument  independence  when  it  is  given  freedom  to  select  what  it  considers  an 
appropriate policy instrument to achieve its mandate as defined by its enabling law.
There  exists  a  growing  body  of  knowledge  on  the  rationale  for  central  bank 
independence.
Following  Berger  et  al.  (2001)  one  assumes  that  government  policy  makers  in  an 
economy try to minimize the following loss function.
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Where 
yt = actual output in the economy
yt* = desired output
x = government weight on output stabilization with x > 0
πt = actual inflation
In the model defined, output is defined in terms of a Lucas supply function of the form:
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Where 
πet = inflation expectation
µt = random shock with zero mean and a constant variance
In Equation 1, policy makers try to minimize the loss function on a period-by-period 
basis.  In doing this, inflation expectation is assumed given.  However, with rational 
expectations, inflation is modeled as:
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In Equation 3, the first term on the right hand side defines the inflation bias of policy 
makers.   The second term reflects  the degree to which stabilization  of output  shocks 
affect inflation. Note that a country with a high inflationary bias would face a problem of 
credibility.  This is why conservatism on the part of a central bank translates into inflation 
aversion relative the government.  In view of the foregoing, the loss function for a central 
bank is defined as:
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In Equation 4, ε represents additional inflation aversion associated with a central bank. 
Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (1998) define monetary policy as:
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Using Equation  5,  Eijffinger  and Hoeberichts  define  γ  as  the  degree  of  central  bank 
independence which measures the extent to which a central bank’s loss function affects 
monetary policy-making.  If γ = 1, then the central bank if fully in control of monetary 
policy making.
In a rational expectations environment, minimizing government’s loss function in 
Equation 1, results in inflation of the form:
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When one compares Equations 3 and 6, it becomes clear that for positive values of γ and 
ε, inflation bias is smaller in Equation 6.  This means that a conservative central bank will 
under  rational  expectations,  be more  inflation-biased than government  policy makers. 
Therefore, an independent and conservative central bank will strive to lower the level of 
inflation if the function is delegated to it.
The Nigerian Financial Landscape And Central Bank Of Nigeria
The predecessor of the Central Bank of Nigeria was the West African Currency Board 
(WACB) which was established by the colonial government in about 1912.  The WACB 
had neither the power to initiate monetary policy nor the power to regulate the flow of 
money  in  circulation  (Olalusi,  1992).  In  the  early  1950s,  the  clamor  for  political 
independence for Nigeria also embodied a call for the establishment of a central bank. 
This call was based on the view that such an institution was needed to consolidate the 
financial  resources  of  the  country  for  the  purpose  of  rapid  economic  development 
(Olalusi, 1992).  According to Bibilari (1962), indigenous banking in Nigeria stemmed 
from a desire to bolster the country’s clamor for political independence rather than an 
attempt to make money by banking operators.
In 1990, Odedokun (1990) reports results indicating that the conventional policy goals of 
price stability, a high level of employment, and external balance did not drive the conduct 
of  monetary  policy  in  Nigeria  from  1970  through  1982.   According  to  the  author, 
aggregate monetary policy considerations featured deposit flows as well as demand for 
funds by the federal government.  Moreover, the ideologies of the ruling government and 
the  need  to  follow  the  political  directives  of  the  government  in  power  attained 
prominence.
The power of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was enlarged via two new Decrees:1 the 
Central  Bank of  Nigeria  Decree  #24 and the  Banks  and  Other  Financial  Institutions 
Decree  #25  (BOFID).   The  new  laws  facilitated  the  introduction  of  new  financial 
instruments for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the CBN to manage the monetary 
system.  Moreover, according to Sanusi (2002a, 2002b), interest  rate deregulation de-
emphasized the use of credit allocation and control policies.  It paved the way for the use 
of indirect controls such as open market operations (OMO), reserve requirements, and 
moral suasion in monetary management (Nnanna, 2001).  
1  Updates to the Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 and significance of proposed amendments to the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 will be considered in Part III to this paper.
Research Methodology
Four measures of financial development employed in this paper are annual data from 
1970 through 2003 obtained from the World Bank and Heston et al (2002).  These data 
which measure the size of financial intermediaries in Nigeria are:
(i) The ratio of deposit money bank assets to central bank assets (DMCD)
(ii) Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (LLGDP)
(iii) Ratio of central bank assets to GDP (CBGDP)
(iv) Ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP (DMGDP). Deposit money banks 
are financial institutions whose deposit liabilities are transferable through 
checks or some other similar payment methods.
This  study  employs  bivariate  cointegration  methodology  to  examine  the  long-term 
relationship between inflation index and the different measures of financial development 
in the Nigerian economy.  Prior to the application of cointegration test, the stationarity 
property  of  the  time  series  is  established  by  applying  the  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) test.  The test is performed on the following equation:
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where,
Δ = (1-L) as in ΔZt = Zt – Zt-1
Z = series under consideration
t = time trend
q = lag chosen such that the error term in (7) is a white noise
The ADF test is applied to test the null hypothesis that each time series has a unit root. 
The test adjusts for error autocorelation.
The cointegration method assumes that if two variables, x and y, contain some stochastic 
trend,  each  can  be  described  as  an  integrated  variable.  Furthermore,  if  a  linear 
combination  (say,  x  –  αy)  is  stationary,  then  the  two  variables  are  considered 
cointegrated.   According  to  Taylor  (1988),  if  economic  theory  suggests  a  long-run 
equilibrium relationship between x and y, then a linear combination of the two series will 
not only be stationary, but their cointegration is a necessary condition for them to have a 
stable  long-run  relationship.   This  suggests  that  the  existence  of  a  stable  long-run 
relationship  between  two  integrated  variables  means  that  they  are  also  cointegrated. 
Thus, the following cointegration regression is employed.
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The test of cointegration of x and y is based on the equation above but with μ generated 
from Equation (8) used in place of Z in Equation (7).  In order words, if μ is integrated 
using the PP test, then x and y are cointegrated.  If x and y are cointegrated, it means that 
both series have a long-run relationship.
Results
Table  : Data Descriptive Statistics
INF DMCD LLGDP CBGDP DMGDP
Mean 0.159   0.605 0.210 0.120 0.153
Standard Deviation 0.104 0.169 0.069 0.075 0.058
Skewness 0.963 0.106 -0.076 0.220 0.483
Kurtosis 2.898 2.267 2.032 2.472 2.062
Jarque-Bera Statistic 5.269 0.824 1.361 0.668 2.568
Table  : Data Correlation Matrix
INF DMCD LLGDP CBGDP DMGDP
INF 1.000 -0.455 0.143 0.518 -0.027
DMCD 1.000 -0.306 -0.892 -0.155
LLGDP 1.000 0.516 0.903
CBGDP 1.000 0.417
DMGDP 1.000
Table  : Unit Root Test Results
INF DMCD LLGDP CBGDP DMGDP
Series in Levels
ADF 
Statistic
-3.140 -1.415 -1.775 -1.446 -1.261
KPSS 
Statisitc
0.171 0.382*** 0.196 0.460*** 0.194
First Difference of Series
ADF 
Statistic
-5.910* -6.114* -4.979* -4.185* -4.500*
KPSS 
Statistic
0.5000** 0.229 0.153 0.261 0.115
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The null 
hypothesis under the ADF test is that the series are non-stationary, but under the KPSS, the null 
hypothesis is that the series are stationary.
Table   :  Johansen Bivariate Cointegration Test Results
λi H0 H1 λ-max 
statistic
H0 H1 λ-trace 
statistic
(a) Inflation and DMCD
0.507 r = 0 r = 1 22.647** r = 0 r = 1 24.209**
0.048 r ≤ 1 r = 2 1.562 r ≤ 1 r = 2 1.562
(b) Inflation and LLGDP
0.359 r = 0 r = 1 14.225 r = 0 r = 1 17.952**
0.110 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.727 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.727
(c)  Inflation and CBGDP
0.380 r = 0 r = 1 15.303** r = 0 r = 1 18.351**
0.091 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.048 r ≤ 1 r = 2 3.048
(d) Inflation and DMGDP
0.325 r = 0 r = 1 12.566 r = 0 r = 1 15.082
0.076 r ≤ 1 r = 2 2.516 r ≤ 1 r = 2 2.516
r denotes the number of cointegration vectors.  ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
The critical statistical levels are based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999).
The  results  in  the  Table  indicate  that  inflation  and  DMCD as  well  as  inflation  and 
CBGDP are cointegrated. 
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FIGURE 1: GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF TIME SERIES
